Chilcot Inquiry - The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - 1st

12.1 | Security Sector Reform

THE JADIRIYAH BUNKER

762. On 13 November, the US military visited an MOI‑controlled detention facility in Baghdad, known as the Jadiriyah bunker, to facilitate the release of a detainee.717 Upon entering the facility they discovered “around 170 detainees” in an emaciated state.

Instruments of torture, including belts, rubber hoses, electrical cable and truncheons were recovered and there was evidence of links to the Badr Corps militia.

763. The following day, Gen Casey and Mr David Satterfield, the US Deputy Chief of Mission, made a strong demarche718 to Mr Jabr, and demanded both a full criminal investigation and a nationwide audit and inspection of MOI facilities conducted by Iraqi and US officials.

764. In the Chairman’s brief for DOP(I) to be held on 15 November, Mr Blair was advised that Mr Patey should raise the issue “in the strongest terms” with Prime Minister Ja’afari and Mr Jabr.719

765. A note from an IPU official to Mr Straw on 22 November stated that Prime Minister Ja’afari had announced on 15 November that a full investigation into the matter would be held.720

766. The official advised Mr Straw that the Embassy had “first picked up suspicions about maltreatment” at the facility on 4 and 5 September in “an uncorroborated informant report to a police adviser”. The Embassy’s Senior Police Adviser had accompanied the US military to the location on 24 October but saw no evidence of abuse in the areas where he was allowed access. The official wrote that before follow‑up action could be taken, the US had “stumbled” upon the mis‑treated detainees.

767. There were indications that Mr Jabr had “been in direct contact with MOI operatives at the Bunker” and that there were “suspicions of other illegal detention centres”. The media had reported Mr Jabr was “playing down the incident significantly”.

768. The IPU would “instruct Baghdad to maintain pressure” on Prime Minister Ja’afari to address the issues.

769. Mr Straw issued a statement the same day, welcoming this decision and condemning illegal detention and torture.

770. On 27 November, The Observer published an article on human rights abuses in Iraq, based on an interview with Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi.721 It quoted him as saying: “The Ministry of the Interior is at the heart of the matter. I am not blaming the Minister himself, but the rank and file are behind the secret dungeons and some of the executions that are taking place.

771. The IPU was concerned that the investigation would slip in the run‑up to elections, and advised Mr Straw on 2 December to reiterate the importance of its progress during a telephone call with Prime Minister Ja’afari.722 The IPU had “received indications” that a representative on the investigation committee and an Iraqi Minister were “trying to whitewash the report”. Concurrently, the IPU was considering with the US and the MOD “the possibility of taking direct MNF‑I action” in other suspected locations of abuse.

772. The IPU raised concerns about the delay in the investigation again with Mr Straw on 7 December.723 A note by a junior official advised Mr Straw to raise the matter with Dr Rice during their bilateral meeting that day. The note said that no action had been taken, other than two meetings of Deputy Prime Minister Rosch Shaway’s committee.

773. As well as continuing to apply pressure for a report to be delivered, the official advised Mr Straw to suggest “snap inspections” of other locations, which ideally would be Iraqi‑led, but could be led by MNF‑I if necessary.

774. An eGram sent from the British Embassy on 17 January 2006 stated that there was “still no sign of any report”.724 Mr Shaway had spoken to the US on 16 January and had blamed the delay on Shia and Badr members appointed to the Commission by Prime Minister Ja’afari and difficulties in working around the election and local holidays. He had told the US that he intended to report in between 10 and 14 days.

775. The eGram also stated that:
• There had been three unannounced inspections of detention facilities by joint Iraqi/MNF‑I forces. The US/MNF‑I selected the sites but Iraqi officials led the investigations.

• Details had been provided about two of the inspections, one facility had 234 detainees claiming abuse (though mostly from previous facilities and not within the last two months), and the other held 13 detainees and was “of a fairly good standard”.

• The US planned to conduct one unannounced search per week, starting the following week.

• The Judicial Commission was carrying out a separate investigation, and was working through the case files of every detainee in Jadiriyah.

• Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/Badr had begun to “push back” against accusations of detainee abuse.

776. In early 2006, the MOI began establishing an abuse complaint process system involving the Inspector General, Internal Affairs and a Public Affairs Office.725 Detention was a particular cause of concern. The DoD’s May 2006 Report to Congress stated: “Many human rights violations occur at detention centres because the centres have inadequate facilities. The centres have no places to shower, pray, or prepare food; plumbing and electrical systems are substandard. Furthermore, the police are not trained as jailers … To date the Joint Iraqi Inspection Committee, consisting of Iraqi Inspectors General from various ministries, supported by the US Embassy and MNF‑I, has inspected seven facilities.”

777. A junior official at the British Embassy Washington emailed IPU on 17 March with a summary of a meeting with US officials.726 She noted that it had been agreed that the UK and US should confront Prime Minister Ja’afari about any efforts to suppress evidence from the Jadiriyah bunker report.

778. Dr Reid visited Iraq from 17 to 20 March.727 A report of his visit from his Private Office on 21 March referred to a meeting with Mr Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in which Dr Reid was told that the US investigation into the Jadiriyah facility had “concluded terrible abuses had taken place and that senior figures were likely to have been aware of them”. A copy of the US investigation report had gone to Prime Minister Ja’afari but “nothing seemed to have come of it”, although they said they had not “pushed that hard”.

779. The minutes of DOP(I) on 30 March recorded that Dr Kim Howells, FCO Minister, had stated:

“… the UK and the US had to press Ja’afari to publish an unexpurgated version of the report into abuse by the Ministry of Interior at the Jadiriyah bunker, and be ready to press the new Iraqi Government to take action against those responsible … Our legacy could not be to construct an edifice in Iraq based on human rights abuses.”728

780. Dr Reid, who chaired the meeting, concluded that it was “critical” to the UK’s objectives that the Iraqi security forces were non‑sectarian; officials “should work urgently on an action plan and messages for use with the US … and an incoming Iraqi Government”.

781. On 20 April, an email from Mr Straw’s Private Secretary to a junior FCO official stated that Ms Clwyd had raised the delayed publication of the Iraqi investigation’s report with Mr Straw that morning: “She asked what we could do to force the publication of the report.”729

782. A junior official in Baghdad relayed a telephone conversation between Ms Clwyd and Mr Patey.730 Mr Patey said:

• Mr Shaways had passed Mr Patey a copy of the report on 19 April.

• The report was consistent with the US report but was “not as hard‑hitting in implicating those involved”.

• It had been sent to Prime Minister Ja’afari but was only signed by Mr Shaways (and not other members of the committee).

• There was no indication that it would be released or acted upon until a government was formed, after which recommendations could be made public.

• The report would not damage Mr Ja’afari but “would be seen as an attack on SCIRI”.

783. Mr Patey also said that other work was in hand on detainee abuse: the bunker was closed, spot‑inspections continued, and the UK was working to remove SCIRI’s influence on the MOI. It wanted to stop the MOI running detention facilities in the longer term. Ms Clwyd “seemed broadly content with this explanation”.

784. On 5 May 2006, Mrs Margaret Beckett became Foreign Secretary. On 9 June, an IPU official advised her that “serious abuse and torture”, including of juveniles, had been discovered at another detention facility (“Site 4”) on 30 May.731 Mr Khalilzad had taken “swift action” with the newly elected Prime Minister, Mr Nuri al‑Maliki, “pressing him to take public action” and to revisit the Jadiriyah bunker incident. Mr Al‑Mailki’s response was “positive”; he committed to establishing a committee to investigate the Site 4 incident.

785. On 19 September, an eGram from Mr Dominic Asquith, now British Ambassador to Iraq, reported that investigations into Jadiriyah and Site 4 abuse were still ongoing.732 He had met Mr Hashim Al‑Shibli, Iraqi Minister of Justice, the previous day, who had been “evasive about when prosecutions would happen”. Mr Asquith had encouraged Mr Al‑Shibli to push for unannounced inspections to be resumed, despite the Minister’s resistance on the basis that security conditions made it difficult.

786. Mr Asquith considered Mr Al‑Shibli “honest and aware of the problems”, but that he

had a “weak political base” and an “inability to confront effectively the powerful vested

interests behind the MOI”.

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717 Telegram 18170 Baghdad to FCO London, 14 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Detainees Found in Bunker.

718 Demarche is the term used to describe a protest by diplomats.

719 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 14 November 2005, ‘DOP(I) – Chairman’s Brief’.

720 Minute IPU [junior official] to Foreign Secretary, 22 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Abuse at Ministry of Interior Detention Facility – follow up’.

721 The Observer, 27 November 2005, Abuse worse than under Saddam, says Iraqi leader.

722 Minute IPU [junior official] to Foreign Secretary, 2 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Secretary of State’s Telephone Conversation with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja’afari’.

723 Minute Paterson to Foreign Secretary, 7 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary – Secretary Rice Speaking Note’.

724 eGram 978/06, Baghdad to FCO, 17 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Detainee Abuse Update’

725 Report to Congress, 26 May 2006, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.

726 Email FCO [junior official] to FCO [junior official], 17 March 2006, ‘Briefing for DCDS(C) – Iraq – Detainees and Abuse’.

727 Minute APS/SoS [MOD] to PS/Policy Director [MOD], 21 March 2006, ‘Secretary of State’s visit to Iraq’.

728 Minutes, 30 March 2006, DOP(I) meeting.

729 Email Private Secretary/SofS [FCO] to FCO [junior official], 20 April 2006, ‘Clwyd: MoI Bunker’.

730 Email FCO [junior official] to FCO [junior official], 20 April 2006, ‘Clwyd: MoI Bunker’.

731 Minute FCO [junior official] to Foreign Secretary, 9 June 2006, ‘Torture at an Iraqi Ministry of Interior Detention Facility’.

732 eGram 40974/06, Baghdad to FCO, 19 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Investigations in HR abuses at Site 4 and Jadriyah’.