الشرق الاوسط اللندنية
GMT 23:52:00 2010
الجمعة 11 يونيو
رئيس الحكومة القادم لا يقاس بعدد المقاعد ولكن بنوعيتها.. وأنا أهيئ لوزارة قوية
بغداد - معد فياض
* هل حُقنت الدماء وروعي الفقراء في حكومتكم؟
- من دون شك.
* ماذا عن ضحايا جسر الأئمة، وضحايا ملجأ الجادرية الذي وعدتم بتشكيل لجان تحقيق حولهما ولا أحد يعرف بنتائج هذه اللجان، كانت تستخدم أنواع من التعذيب في ملجأ الجادرية وظهر وقت ذلك فن التعذيب بالدريل (المثقاب الكهربائي)، والجثث التي كانت تلقى بالشوارع، ووصل العراق إلى حد الاقتتال الطائفي والقتل على الهوية، هذا كله حدث في حكومتكم؟
- ما يتعلق بجسر الأئمة فإن مفاجأة حصلت على الجسر وهي أن أحدهم أخبر الناس أن هناك تفجيرا سيحصل، فهرع الناس المشاة المتوجهون إلى الإمام الكاظم (عليه السلام) وسقطوا من الجسر، وسقوطهم لم يكن بسبب حرب طائفية، وخذ بنظر الاعتبار أن جسر الأئمة لا يربط فقط بين ضفتين جغرافيتين هي الأعظمية والكاظمية، بل يربط بين مجتمعيتين مذهبيتين هي السنة والشيعة.
* ولكنهم يعيشون ويتعايشون هكذا منذ مئات السنين؟
- وهو كذلك. ولكن ماذا فعلنا نحن لنمنع أي تداعيات طائفية يستغلها الطائفيون من السنة أو الشيعة، سألنا هل هناك من الضحايا السنة، فوفقنا أن نلتقط اسم عثمان علي العبيدي الذي من بين ألف شيعي رددت اسمه في الفضائيات ورددته نشيدا في كل مكان، العبيدي السني الذي أنقذ ستة من الشيعة ومات خلال إنقاذه للضحية السابعة. هذا كان إجراؤنا في مواجهة الطائفية، ولو كان ذلك قد حدث في غير حكومتنا ربما لاستعرت نار الطائفية في كل مكان. والأمر ذاته حدث مع سامراء وكان المواجه لمنع نار الطائفية من الاشتعال. عندما شكلنا الحكومة في 2005 كان هناك بعض الفرقاء السياسيين لم يريدوا للإخوة السنة من المشاركة في الحكومة، وأرادوا لهم أن يأخذوا حجمهم الذي يتناسب مع وجودهم في البرلمان وكانوا 17 من مجموع 225 عضوا لكنني صممت ولثلاثة أشهر على أن يأتوا بعدد من الوزراء السنة يتناسب مع حجمهم الاجتماعي وليس حسب تمثيلهم البرلماني، وعندما لاحظوا أن إصراري لا مجاملة فيه أذعنوا وشكلت الحكومة وطارت بأجنحتها وكانت حكومة فاعلة بطرفها السني العربي. أضف إلى ذلك أن الوزراء السنة الذين عملوا معي في الحكومة بفاعلية هم اليوم أقطاب سياسيون ومنهم الإخوة، أسامة النجيفي وعبد مطلك الجبوري والدكتورة أزهار الشيخلي والدكتور سعدون الدليمي.
* وماذا عن ملجأ الجادرية؟
- موضوع ملجأ الجادرية لم أعلم به حتى الدقائق التي جاءني بها السفيران الأميركي والبريطاني برفقة جنرال عسكري وحدثاني عن الموضوع.
* لكننا كشفنا عن ممارسات ملجأ الجادرية وكتبنا في «الشرق الأوسط» قبل ذلك بأكثر من شهر؟
http://aljadriya.blogspot.com/2008/04/blog-post_01.html
- دعني أقول لكم إنني لم أسمع عن ملجأ الجادرية إلا عن طريق السفيرين الأميركي والبريطاني وسألتهم عما يحدث فتحدثوا عن التفاصيل، وخلال وجودهم معي شكلت لجنة برئاسة الدكتور روز شاويس وكان نائبا لرئيس الوزراء، وحددت فترة للانتهاء من التحقيق، ولم يُستكمل التحقيق بسبب وفاة والدته (روز) وطلب التمديد وتم التمديد لمدة أسبوع ثم جاءني التقرير خاليا من توقيع أحد أعضاء اللجنة الذي اعتذر عن التوقيع فقلت لهم ليوقع مع التحفظ، ولم يوافق عندها، فحولنا التقرير مع استكمال التحقيق إلى السلطة القضائية. وفهمت فيما بعد أن اقتحام القوات الأميركية لملجأ الجادرية لم يحصل بسبب قضية عراقية وإنما لوجود إحدى الشخصيات التي تحمل جنسية أميركية كانت موجودة في الملجأ. تفاصيل هذه القضية لم أكن أعرف بها، واستنادا على ذلك طلبت الدخول إلى كل السجون ومراعاة ظروف السجناء، وحسب اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لعام 1948 التي تتعلق بحقوق الإنسان ومراعاة ظروف السجناء لنعرف إن كانت ظاهرة ملجأ الجادرية، أو جزء منها موجودة في السجون العراقية. وأحيطكم علما أن صدام حسين كان قد أضرب عن الطعام عام 2005، وجاءني ثلاثة من الأميركيين المسؤولين عن سجنه وقالوا إنه يطالب بتوفير بعض الأمور.
* ماذا كانت طلباته؟
- أمور تتعلق بتوفير بعض الأثاث في غرفته وإجراء الاتصالات، فقلت لهم أعطوه كامل حقوقه وكذلك الحقوق التي تنص عليها اتفاقية 1948 وفوجئوا، فقلت لهم أنا طبيب وإذا جاءني صدام حسين لأغراض العلاج فسوف أعالجه لكن عندما يتحول إلى القضاء فلا دخل لنا وسيأخذ جزاءه العادل عن طريق القضاء.
وكتب الصحفي احمد المهنا موضوع بعنوان الرجل بعيد الغور
قال فيه :
وأذكر أنني، الرجل الفقير الى اي عدة سوى فضول الصحفي، كنت قد رأيت بأم عيني عدة مرات بعض مجريات ملجأ الجادرية، ثم وليت بعد اطلاعي عليه فرارا. أما رئيس الوزراء يومذاك الجعفري فلم يكن قد عرف به البتة، يقول" موضوع ملجأ الجادرية لم أعلم به حتى الدقائق التي جاءني بها السفيران الأميركي والبريطاني برفقة جنرال وحدثاني عن الموضوع". وأنا أبصم بالعشرة على صدقه!
[Fayyad] What about Al-*Jadiriyah Shelter*?
[Al-Ja'fari] I did not know about the issue of Al-*Jadiriyah Shelter* until
the American and British Ambassadors came to me with a military general and
told me about the matter.
[Fayyad] But we exposed the practices at Al-*Jadiriyah Shelter* and wrote
about this in Al-Sharq al-Awsat more than a month before that time?
[Al-Ja'fari] Let me tell you that I did not hear about Al- *Jadiriyah
Shelter* except from the American and British Ambassadors. I asked them what
was going on and they talked about the details. During their presence with
me, I formed a committee headed by Dr Roz Shawis who was a deputy prime
minister and I fixed a deadline for ending the investigations. The probe was
not completed because his mother (Roz's mother) died. He asked for an
extension so a one-week extension was approved. Then the report came to me
without the signature of one of the committee members who apologized from
signing. I told them to make him sign and register his reservations. He did
not agree. So we transferred the report and the pursuit of the investigation
to the judiciary. I understood later that American forces broke into Al-*Jadiriyah
Shelter* not because of an Iraqi issue but because of the presence of a
person holding American nationality in the shelter. I did not know the
details of that case. On the basis of this I asked for inspection of all
prisons and checking the conditions of the prisoners according to the UN
Convention of 1948 on human rights and the conditions of prisoners to find
out whether Al-*Jadiriyah Shelter* was a phenomenon and whether similarities
also exists in Iraqi prisons. I would like to inform you that Saddam Husayn
had staged a hunger strike in 2005 and three American officials came to m e
from his prison and said that he was demanding that some things be provided.
[Fayyad] What were his demands?
[Al-Ja'fari] Matters on providing some furniture in his room and making
contacts. I told them 'give him his full rights and also the rights
stipulated in the 1948 Convention'. They were surprised. I told them that I
was a physician and if Saddam Husayn came to me for treatment I shall treat
him, but when he is referred to the judiciary we have no involvement and he
will get his fair punishment at the hands of the judiciary.
[Fayyad] In 2005 you had an experience that might be bitter for any Iraqi
politician. Your assistant in Al-Da'wa Party, Nuri al- Maliki, the head of
the government the term of which had expired, took from you the position of
the Prime Minister with support from the Sadrist who have made you their
candidate to head the coming government. Then Al-Maliki took control of the
leadership of your party, Al-Da'wa. How did you take this?
[Al-Ja'fari] I have to repeat to you what happened, and it is different from
what you kindly mentioned. On 12 February 2006 I was reelected Prime
Minister. There were some artificial obstacles by some Iraqi parties in
which the American and British Administrations were involved. After this
they told me that the Presidency of the Republic or Chairmanship of the
Political Council for National Security was open for me. I told them that
what the Iraqi people decide is the domain that is open for me. It was the
Iraqi people who chose me as Prime Minister and they are the ones who
decide. If this route is closed, I return to Parliament which is the house
of the people. I said that the people are the ones who decide, not you. I
turned down the positions of President of the Republic and Chairman of the
Political Council for National Security. In order to placate me, they asked
me to choose somebody from Al-Da'wa Party to head the government. Brother
Al-Maliki was my choice and he was not imposed on me. They dealt with me as
being from Al-Da'wa Party and gave the right to the party, so I chose
Al-Maliki. I hope that this fact would be corrected. Secondly, the Sadris
voted for me in the first session, within the Unified Iraqi Coalition, as
Prime Minister. So their votes were transferred to Al-Maliki as the
candidate of Al-Da'wa Party. As for the leadership of Al-Da'wa Party, I
attended the conference and had important observations on what happened at
the conference. These are internal matters that concern the party, so I made
reservations about them and did not accept the results. They asked for a
period of six months after which they would reconvene the conference but I
said no, I do not accept the context from now for six months and these are
my observations that must be accepted. So I differed with them and left the
organization of the Islamic Al-Da'wa Party by leaving the conference. It was
my own decision without pressure from anybody, and I kept to myself the
observations I had.
[Fayyad] While entering your premises I read the slogan of your Trend,
"reform", which says "respect for human beings and taking care of the poor".
Did you take care of the poor in your government?
[Al-Ja'fari] For us, we regarded poverty as an enemy because the majority of
the Iraqis are in a state of poverty.
[Fayyad] Is it not strange that the majority of the Iraqis should be poor
when their country is a rich country?
[Al-Ja'fari] This is a crime. A country as rich as Iraq, which is the
richest country, yet its people are the poorest people. This is a contrast
we have noted. Our slogan as you read it is a phased slogan that begins by
taking care of citizens and ends with protecting citizens. It starts with
helping the poor and ends by making the poor rich. Otherwise what does it
mean to respect or take care of the poor? What will change? We want to make
the poor rich. This is not a cliche but a reality that awaits the
circulation of wealth and how to put 70bn dollars in the service of a
population of 30m. We can very efficiently reach our objective if we get rid
of the notorious quota arrangements and the rampant financial and
administrative corruption. We were waiting for every opportunity to
distribute presents to the people during feasts. We used to distribute all
items on the rations card and if there is a shortage in some staples we
would compensate it in money. In the blessed month of Ramadan we used to add
a gift to the citizens, like tomato paste for instance. When bombings took
place - they were reduced during our government below what they were in the
previous government - we would give a sum of money as a present to the
families of the martyrs and half that amount to the injured. In addition, we
used to respond to the requests of delegations from the poor areas. All
these were immediate measures. Our plans called for combating corruption
through the Contracts Committee in which we reduced corruption to 95 per
cent [as published]. The Minister had the power to sign contracts of up to
three million dollars. Contracts involving higher amounts would go to the
Contracts Committee which held 75 meetings, at the rate of three meetings
every two weeks. We opened the door for appointments in balancing the
country's requirements, so 95,000 employees were appointed in the Ministry
of Education and 50,000 employees were appointed in the Ministry of
Industry. Five thousand media people who had been laid off because of the
cancellation of the Ministry of Information were transferred to the Ministry
of Culture. I received the Armed Forces with a number of less than one third
[of the original number] and turned it over with more than two thirds.
[Fayyad] Do you believe that the formation of the government will require
much time?
[Al-Ja'fari] I believe it will take a few weeks, the word "few" in the
Arabic language meaning from three to nine.
Originally published by Al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London, in Arabic 12 Jun
10.
(c) 2010 BBC Monitoring Middle East. Provided by ProQuest LLC. All rights
Reserved.
A service of YellowBrix, Inc.
Publication Date: 2010-06-14
© 2010, YellowBrix, Inc.
By utilizing the content on this page, you agree to the legal terms
Text of report by Saudi-owned leading pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq al- Awsat
website on 12 June
[Fayyad] Do you believe that your Prime Ministry was strong or that it did
not get the chance to achieve what you wanted?
[Al-Ja'fari] Both. It was strong, and I described it in an address to Iraqi
parliamentarians as having been the strongest cabinet in Iraq's history. I
hope it will not be the strongest in Iraq's future. I did not describe it
this way out of an emotional feeling but because of the cohesion of the
ministers in attending meetings, adoption of decisions, and their
confrontation of challenges and complex dossiers led by financial corruption
through the Contracts Committee. There are also the surprises which that
government managed to face in a firm way, the problem that occurred at
Al-A'imma Bridge, the bombings in Samarra, and its having fulfilled the
scheduling and implementation of the assignments for which it was formed,
namely the Constitution and parliament, at the scheduled dates.
It would be correct to say that the period was not enough. The government
was formed in May 2005 and had to continue until the end of the year. This
meant that six or seven months of its work were transformed into a caretaker
government. If it had continued for a longer period we would have achieved
more.
[Fayyad] Like being extended for a full session for instance?
[Al-Ja'fari] No. The government's term expired but I was reelected and then
the circumstances that took place occurred.
[Fayyad] What happened?
[Al-Ja'fari] At the time there were electoral conflicts and quotas that
controlled the country. A state of dealings and bargaining over the Prime
Ministry began after the elections took place and after everything ended.
The American and British Administrations were involved at the time and went
along with the bad trend for quotas. There were signals from Condoleezza
Rice (the then US Secretary of State) and Jack Straw (the then British
Foreign Secretary) that the period for forming the government had taken too
long. It appears to me that they did not understand that the Iraqi
Constitution stipulates the election of the Speaker of Parliament and
President of the Republic before choosing the Prime Minister. I replied to
them (the US and British Secretaries) that this issue was up to the Iraqi
people and that I had come through a democratic way and would withdraw only
through a democratic way: Either that the Parliament does not endorse my
heading of the government, or that the National Coalition withdraws my
nomination, or death.
[Fayyad] Or?
[Al-Ja'fari] Death.
[Fayyad] Death?
[Al-Ja'fari] Yes.
[Fayyad] What do you mean by death, fighting or what?
[Al-Ja'fari] The concept of death is broad, and they understood what I meant
(he laughs heartily). There was nothing but this choice. I told them 'you
are talking with somebody whose nature is like this'. I continued my
insistence on my position then felt that the National Coalition was being
exposed to fractures. I did not want to make the people who chose the
biggest bloc face a fractured bloc with my name linked to this, even though
I was elected in a democratic way. So I returned the task to those who can
decide on the issue.
[Fayyad] But not that easily?
[Al-Ja'fari] No, with complete ease. When I accepted it, I accepted it as a
responsibility not as a bounty, for I am not one of those who care for
bounties in life. This is a responsibility. What does it mean to be a Prime
Minister? It means that you do not eat or sleep like the others. This is why
those who prepare themselves for the Prime Ministry in these conditions must
take the responsibility into account and not deal with the Prime Ministry
with the logic of wishes or of relaxation but with the logic of constructive
confrontation and trust in Allah and the people and their capabilities in
order to be able to translate these aspirations into a reality on the
ground. This requires confidence in the future and confidence in self as
well as devotion to the people. Those who understand responsibility this way
find that they can assume it easily and that if the country's interests
require they would give it up. I of course did not give it up but restored
this responsibility and that assignment to the Coalition to decide what it
deems fit.
[Fayyad] But you said that this was a shari'ia [religious duty] assignment,
I mean, that of your presence as Prime Minister?
[Al-Ja'fari] I felt inside that it was an assignment, and when I take
anything as a responsibility I do not take it just because I have a desire
for it. When I play table tennis I enjoy it. When I eat I enjoy food. But
when I accept the responsibility for an entire country I worry about the
blood and how to spare the blood of the innocent, raise the standards of the
poor, and how to calculate well the political factors and consider all of
them [Iraqis] as my sons, from all Islamic denominations, all the citizens,
and how to move from desire to responsibility. The most difficult type of
responsibility is that for which I am taken to account by God. Thus this
responsibility was shari'ia.
[Fayyad] Did your government spare blood and take care of the poor?
[Al-Ja'fari] Without doubt.
[Fayyad] What about the victims of Al-A'imma Bridge, and the victims of
Al-Jadiriyah shelter? You promised to form investigation committees on them
but no one knows the results these committees reached. Forms of torture were
used at Al-Jadiriyah shelter, and it was at this time that the art of
torture with the electric drill was heard about, and the bodies that were
thrown in the streets. Iraq reached the point of sectarian infighting and
killing on identity. All this happened during your government?
[Al-Ja'fari] Concerning Al-A'imma Bridge, a surprise took place on the
bridge. It was that somebody told the people that there would be an
explosion, so the pedestrians heading to Imam Al-Kazim (peace upon him)
rushed and fell from the bridge. They did not fall because of a sectarian
war. Take into consideration that Al-A'imma Bridge does not link only two
banks, Al-A'zamiyah and Al-Kazimiyah, but links two denominational
communities, the Sunnis and the Shi'is.
[Fayyad] But they have been living and coexisting like this for hundreds of
years?
[Al-Ja'fari] So it is. But what did we do to prevent any sectarian
ramifications that would be exploited by sectarian-minded Sunnis or Shi'is?
We asked about who were the Sunni victims and were lucky in picking the name
of Uthman Ali al-Ubaydi who was among 1,000 Shi'is. Satellite TV channels
mentioned his name and sang praise for him everywhere as the Sunni al-Ubaydi
who saved six Shi'is and died during his attempt to save a seventh victim.
This was our conduct in the face of sectarianism. If this had happened under
a government other than ours, perhaps the fire of sectarianism would have
been ignited everywhere. The same thing happened in Samarra, and the
confrontation was to prevent the fires of sectarianism from being spreading.
When we formed the Government in 2005 there were some political factions
that did not want the Sunni brothers to take part in the Government. They
wanted them to take positions in proportion to the size that is in
accordance with their presence in Parliament. They were 17 out of 225
parliament members, but I insisted for three months that they should bring a
number of Sunni ministers that is commensurate with their social size and
not their parliamentary representation. When they realized that I am serious
about my insistence, they accepted and the government was formed and flew
with its wings. It was an effective government with its Arab, Sunni,
component. Add to this the fact that the Sunni ministers who worked
effectively with me in the government are today political magnates. They
include brothers Usamah al-Nujayfi, Abd- Muttalik al-Jabburi, Dr Azhar
al-Shaykhaly, and Dr Sa'dun al-Dlimi.
